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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VINAL MILLETT, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
GLORIA LANGSTON, 
Defendant a.nd Appellant. 
Case 
No. 8750 
Appellant's Brief 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The problems presented in this case are: What 
business agreement existed between the parties for 
establishing a trailer court in Moab, Utah; has such 
agreement been terminated and if so, when; and what 
are the present obligations of each party to the other. 
There was no written agreement between the parties 
(R. 45), and their testimony shows substantial disagree-
ment on the above questions. The nature of the business 
agreement, its duration, and the obligations can be 
established only from the legal implications of the 
evidence. 
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In May, 1954, Vinal Millett (Respondent here, but 
Plaintiff below and so identified herein) discussed 
trailer court possibilities with his niece, Gloria Lang-
ston, (Appellant here, but Defendant below and so 
referred to herein). Plaintiff had no specific property 
in mind (R. 46, Ex. 2: Dep. VM 4). He discussed Moab, 
Utah, as a location because of its boom-town character, 
but had never gone there to investigate (R. 46, 79). 
At that time, Plaintiff, a carpenter (R. 36), was 
seasonally unemployed (R. 51), and was on unemploy--
ment relief (R. 51). Plaintiff was a favorite brother of 
Defendant's mother (R. 104), and family ties had been 
very close (R. 106). Plaintiff needed financial help (R. 
107), and in March and on May 17, 1954, Defendant 
gave Plaintiff $60 to pay on a loan, a portion of which 
was for purchase of Plaintiff's car (R. 57, 83). Plaintiff 
was anxious to find security in some permanent work 
(R. 107, 108), and states he consented to let Defendant 
participate in his plan for trailer court development 
because she had a little money (R. 36, 37). Defendant 
states she was investigating a possible way to help him 
(Ex. 4: Dep. GL 7). 
In May, 1954, Defendant and her mother, together 
with Plaintiff, drove to ~[oab (R,. 36}. The parties 
proposed to rent land and establish a trailer court, with 
the Defendant supplying necessary funds until money 
could be obtained from the operations, a11d with the 
Plaintiff providing the "'"ork required (R. 3·7, 46, 48, 
79). Plaintiff stated: 
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''Well, we were to go in on this, and she was 
to furnish the necessary cash down payment and 
cash as far as it went until we got on paying 
basis and me stay down there and put it over.'' 
(Ex. 2: Dep. VM 4; R. 37.) 
Efforts to rent property in Moab were unsuccessful 
(R. 79). About May 20, 1954, Defendant purchased five 
( 5) acres from a. Frank Peterson for $1,100 an acre, 
with payments of $1200 down, and $100 a month there-
after (R. 48, 81). Defendant paid the earnest money of 
$500, and the balance of the $1,200 down payment, took 
title in her name, and has made the payments subse-
quently (R. 54, 86, Ex. 2: Dep. VM 17). Planitiff signed 
no papers, made no payments on the land, and assumed 
no obligations for paying for the land (R. 48, 54, 55, 56) ; 
nor was he to provide any money at any time (R. 56). 
Plaintiff states he demanded a one-third interest in 
the land for himself and one-third for his brother, Ira, 
and that the Defendant refused to include their names 
in the transaction (R. 36). Plaintiff alleges and the 
Defendant denies that their names were to be included 
later (Ex. 2: Dep. VM 7, 8, R. 82). The Plaintiff, the 
Defendant and a real estate man named Bill Allen were 
present (R. 45). The Plaintiff recalled that Mrs. 
Boshard, his sister and the Defendant's mother, was 
also present (R. 45), but Mrs. Boshard denies this (R. 
102). 
The parties proceeded to establish a trailer court 
on the land purchased by Defendant (R. 45), with 
Plaintiff moving to Moab in May, 1954 and remaining 
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there until July, 1955 (Ex. 2: Dep. VM 5). During that 
period improvements were made and installations made 
for a trailer court. These include six small rental cabins 
' two bathhouses for use of trailer occupants, two wells, 
and two septic tanks, together with necessary bulldozer 
work, plumbing, electrical work, and similar work. (Ex. 
2: Dep. VM 8, 12, R. 27 Answer #26, R. 90). 
Plaintiff contends that all materials necessary for 
seven cabins were secured from Ira Millett and delivered 
precut to Moab in a truck hired by Defendant (R. 49, 
50). The first cabin was erected by Ira in order to 
show Plaintiff how to assemble such cabins (R. 72, 113). 
The remainder were erected by Plaintiff with some help 
(R. 37, 38). Plaintiff states that the materials obtained 
from Ira were to entitle Ira to a one-third share of the 
property (R. 49, Ex. 2: Dep. VM 21). Ira stated he 
had received some $25, or $41 from Defendant, but no 
other payments (R. 70). He never submitted a bill to 
Defendant (R. 72). Defendant maintains that the 
materials "rere acquired by Ira in his name because he 
operated a sawmill and small lumber ~Tard and it was 
thought he could get better prices, but that she made 
payments for such materials directly to Tri-State Lum-
ber Co. and to Frank I. Larsen Lumber Company and 
that she does not O"\Ye Ira any balance ( R. 111). She 
admits Plaintiff may ha.Ye obtained some 2 x 2s from 
Ira but that she 'vas not a party to any such transaction 
and knows no details (R. 113). The parties agree that 
Gloria terminated a11y relations "\Yith Ira shortly after 
Plaintiff moved to l\!oab (R. 39, 71). 
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Defendant signed a new contract to acquire addi-
tional acres, making a total of 14.57 acres, and agreed 
to pay an additional $100 a month on the contract (R. 
81). Defendant states the purchase was made by her 
after being offered to her by the real estate man (R. 
81). Plaintiff states he arranged the second purchase 
and said he would take the deal if Defendant did not 
(R. 54). 
The Plaintiff remained in Moab from May, 1954, 
until the middle of July, 1955 (R. 40, Ex. 2: Dep. VM 8), 
except for six or more visits to Salt Lake City to see 
his wife (R. 53). During this period the Plaintiff had 
no other employment or source of income (R. 52, Ex. 2: 
Dep. VJ\1 26), except for the month of June, 1955, when 
he worked as a carpenter on the new Moab post office 
(R. 40). During Plaintiff's stay in Moab, Defendant 
visited the trailer court several times (R. 65). 
Plaintiff performed labor on the construction of the 
trailer court, but also employed third parties to do 
certain of the work (R. 38, 63). Payment for the services 
of these persons was made either from the gross collec-
tions of the trailer court (R. 63, 64), from the Defend-
ant's personal funds (R. 38, 63, 64), or in some instances 
by giving free rental or by the transfer of certain of 
the realty which Defendant had purchased (R. 63). 
During the period from May, 1954, to July 1955, 
rentals for use of the trailer court facilities were col-
lected (R. 62). The Plaintiff states that all such rentals 
were collected by third parties hired by him to represent 
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him for this purpose (R. 62, Ex. 2: Dep. VM 11, 18). 
Such third persons issued receipts for such money 
collected and retained a carbon copy of such receipts. 
The carbons, together with the money collected, were 
turned over to the Plaintiff (R. 62, Ex. 2: Dep. VM 18). 
Subsequently, Plaintiff delivered to the Defendant such 
carbons of the receipts, together with copies of bills 
and other records in his possession. None of the monies 
collected were turned over to or sent to the Defendant 
(R. 28, line 1; 54, 56, 134). At the trial the Plaintiff 
testified that the Defendant made some collections while 
visiting the trailer court (R. 66), but that he personally 
had made none (R. 62). The Defendant stated she had 
made some collections while at Moab (R. 85), but that 
none of the money collected by herself or by Plaintiff, 
or by those persons hired by Plaintiff, was ever retained 
by or delivered to her (R. 86). 
Testimony as to the amount of monies collected by 
Plaintiff is conflicting. Plaintiff states that the average 
monthly collections came to approximately $240 a month 
(R. 41). The receipts for the same period, as placed in 
evidence by the Plaintiff show collections by him in the 
total amount of $5,569.39 (R. 185). Similar discrep-
ancies exist as to the disposition of the money collected. 
Plaintiff stated that he paid trailer court bills (R. 41, 
Ex. 2: Dep. VM 18) and payments for labor and ma-
terials (R. 41, Ex. 2: Dep. \T~I 18). Plaintiff also stated 
that he made \Yithdra\Yals for personal expenses, in-
cluding a dollar a day for living expenses (R. 41, 53, 
54, 56, Ex. 2: Dep. VM 26), $45 a month for some seven 
months for car payments (R. 42, 53, Ex. 2: Dep. VM 
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27), and payments to his wife in Salt Lake City (R. 42, 
53, Ex. 2: Dep. VM 27). Plaintiff further stated that 
insufficient funds were available for improvements to 
the trailer court, that he had to secure additional monies 
from Defendant, and that her failure to provide suffi-
cient funds held him up (R. 41, 59, 63, 64). 
During the trial, Defendant called as its witness, 
Frank Vance, a certified public accountant with the firm 
of Ernst and Ernst, who testified that he had examined 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 5 through 14, and Defendant's Ex-
hibit D. 15, which were all the receipts and records of 
disbursements which were available to the parties (R. 
144). Mr. Vance stated that he could not certify that 
the records were a complete record of the business 
transactions, but that based on the records before him, 
certain conclusions could be drawn (R. 148). The sum-
mary by Mr. Vance for the period of six (6) months 
ending December 31, 1954, and the six (6) months ending 
June 30, 1955, show the following (R. 185), with a twelve 
( 12) month total added : 
(Summary set forth on p. 8) 
Defendant testified that she secured the money paid 
by her from some she had saved and some she borrowed 
(Ex. 4: Dep. GL 15, 21). In addition some payments 
were made by Defendant by conveying lots (Ex. 4: Dep. 
GL 16). Plaintiff stated that he withdrew money for his 
expenses from the business (R. 21, 23, 41) but that he 
had no savings, no other source of income than the one 
month of work on the post office (R. 52) and the one 
hundred dollars he borrowed from his brother (R. 52). 
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Defendant Plaintiff Other Total 
Cash Receipts 0 2,629.89 0 2,629.89 0 0 2,939.50 5,569.39 0 0 2,939.50 5,569.39 
Business 2,250.33 422.14 138.91 2,811.39 
00 Disbursements 2,492.33 4, 7 42.66 524.99 947.13 485.69 624.60 3,503.01 6,314.39 
---
Excess (Deficit) (2,250.33) 2,207.75 (138.91) (181.49) 
of Cash Receipts (2,492.33) 2,414.51 ( 485.69) (563.51) 
Over Business 
Disbursements (4,742.66) 4,622.26 (624.60) (745.00) 
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Plaintiff stated that receipts were to be used for trailer 
court improvements when available (R. 37) but that 
very little was (R. 56). Defendant stated that Plaintiff 
was to get receipts and those were to compensate him 
(R. 116, 117, Ex. 4: Dep. GL 10, 23) but that she was to 
receive part of profits, if any (R. 116, Ex. 2: Dep. GL 23), 
and there was no understanding Plaintiff could keep 
receipts over and above expenses (R. 133). 
Regarding disposition of receipts and withdrawals, 
Plaintiff stated that he considered the monies taken by 
him as expense money and not as either income or a 
loan (Ex. 2: Dep. VM 25). Defendant filed a Federal 
income tax for 1954 (Exhibit 13) taking a depreciation 
on installed property and furnishings valued at $532.54 
and on six cabins and one lavatory valued at $2,097.57. 
Rent on six frame cabins was shown as $2,118 and 
expenses as $3,243. 70. No item reflected any sums with-
drawn by Plaintiff. The 1955 Federal income tax of 
Defendant (Ex. 14) covers the entire calendar year, 
and again reflects no monies withdrawn by Plaintiff. 
About mid-July, 1955, the Defendant and a friend 
visited the trailer court in Moab (R. 97). At this time 
the improvements of the trailer court consisted of the 
six wood cabins, two bathhouses with washing facilities, 
two septic tanks, and two wells (Ex. 2: Dep. VM 8, 12). 
The Plaintiff testified that he stated that at this time 
the work of setting up the trailer court was finished 
(R. 37, Ex. 2: Dep. VM 23), and that he advised the 
Defendant that a woman could ''take care of this part 
of it" (R. 42) and that he asked the Defendant if she 
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desired to ''stay down there'' (R. 42). Plaintiff also 
testified that he asserted a desire to return to his wife 
in Salt Lake City but that he desired to return to the 
trailer court in the fall or winter (R. 43, Ex. 2: Dep. VM 
23, 24). Testimony by the Defendant was that Plaintiff 
said "he wasn't happy, he was tired of Moab and had 
had all he wanted of that kind of life" (R. 98). The 
friend's testimony was that she was with Plaintiff and 
Defendant most of the time they were together during 
the trip to Moab and that she did not hear Plaintiff 
make any statement of an intention to return (R. 98). 
Plaintiff returned to Salt Lake City on July 20, 
1955 (R. 40), in the company of the Defendant and her 
friend, with Defendant driving one of Plaintiff's two 
cars, one of which had a trailer and the other of which 
'vas quite old (Ex. 4: Dep. GL 12). Plaintiff stated that 
he "left tools down there" (Ex. 2: Dep. VM 30), but 
Defendant testified that he took his possessions with 
him (R. 121). The Plaintiff stated that at the time he 
left Moab ''everything that had been mutually owed 
from the receipts of the trailer court had been settled 
(R. 59, Ex. 2: Dep. VM 18). Defendant stated that 
Plaintiff moved out (R. 121) and that he wanted to 
leave Moab (R. 88). 
On July 25, 1955, Plaintiff started work as a car-
penter in Salt Lake City (Ex. 2: Dep. VJ\i 28), and he 
testified both that he has been continuously employed 
since leaving Maob and that he had not (R. 64, Ex. 2: 
Dep. VM 29). Plaintiff has not returned to Moab since 
July, 1955 (Ex. 2: Dep. VM 25). 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
After Plaintiff left Moab, Defendant hired a woman 
to run the trailer court (Dep. VM 24). When the City 
of Moab passed a tax on trailer homes, the trailer court 
business declined drastically (Ex. 4 : Dep. G L 19). 
Thereafter, the Defendant closed the trailer court, but 
allowed the woman to live there and make rentals if 
she wished, but to pay all bills and take care of the 
property ( R. 123). 
On July 27, 1956, Plaintiff :filed this suit against 
the Defendant alleging a partnership agreement, the 
conduct of the trailer court business as a partnership, 
and the wrongful exclusion of the Plaintiff from the 
business (R. 1). Plaintiff prayed for a receivership, 
dissolution, accounting, distribution of partnership 
assets, and for punitive damages (R. 2). 
On September 3, 1957, the court made findings of 
fact and conclusions of law (R. 187, 188, 189) and based 
thereon entered its judgment awarding a sum of money 
to the Plaintiff and against the Defendant, and also 
decreeing a system of equal distribution of the build-
ings and improvements upon the property (R. 190). It 
is from this judgment that the Defendant appeals. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDE.NCE' IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPO·R.T 
THE FINDING OF THE c·ouRT THAT THE PLAINTIFF 
AND DEFENDANT ENTERED INTO A PARTNERSHIP 
11 
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AGREEMENT FOR THE CONSTRUCTION AND RUN-
NING OF A TRAILER. COURT. 
POINT II. 
'fHE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IN JULY, 
1955, THE PARTIES HAD AN ACCOUNTING AS TO 
INCOME RECEIVED AND EXPENDITURES MADE AS 
OF T'HAT TIME WITHOUT THE BUSINESS ASSOCIA-
TION OF THE PARTIES BEING DISSOLVED AND 
TERMINATED. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING DISTRIBUTION 
OF P'URP·ORTED PARTNERSHIP ASSETS IN MANNER 
CONTRAR.Y TO· UTAH CODE ANN. 1953, SEC. 48-1-37. 
POINT IV. 
THE JUDGMENT MUST FAIL BECAUSE THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW DO 
NOT SUPP'ORT THE JUDGMENT . 
. A.RGU~IENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE FINDING OF THE COURT THAT THE PLAINTIFF 
AND DEFE·NDANT ENT'ERED INTO A PARTNERSHIP 
AGREEMENT FOR THE CONSTRUCTION AND RUN-
NING OF A TRAILER COURT. 
1~ 
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One of the findings made by the. trial court is : 
'' 1. Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a 
Partnership Agreement for the construction and 
running of a Trailor (sic) Court. '' ( R. 187). 
This court has the responsibility to review the evi-
dence. Nokes v. Continental Minti.ng & Milling Co., 6 
Utah 2d 177, 308 P. 2d 954, at 954 (1954). 
That the parties' relationship might have resulted 
1n a partnership with profit sharing aspects in the 
future was not unlikely, but the only reliable evidence 
in the record - the conduct of the parties themselves -
is conclusive to the effect that such had not yet been 
their agreement. There is no disagreement that there 
was an understanding between the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant for the construction and running of a trailer 
court at Moab, Utah. It does not follow that such an 
understanding meets the legal requirements for a part-
nership. Unless a partnership is established the Plain-
tiff can not claim a partner's interest in the trailer 
court, nor can he claim a partnership interest during 
the period after the association is dissolved, nor a right 
to any returns from the business after the. association 
is both dissolved and terminated. The plaintiff has the 
burden of proving the existence of a partnership. 
Benson v. Rozzelle, 85 Utah 582, 39 P. 2d 1113 
(1934); 
Burnett v. Lemon, 185 Ore. 54, 199 P. 2d 910 
(1948). 
In Burnett v. Lemon, 185 Ore. 54, 199 P. 2d 910, 915 
(1948) the Supreme Court of Oregon, in a case strikingly 
13 
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similar on its facts to the present controversy, adopted 
the rule of 40 Am. J ur., Partnership, Sec. 43, p. 156: 
''In determining whether an actual partner-
ship relation arises from or exists by virtue of a 
particular agreement, one of the most widely 
accepted tests applicable especially as between 
the parties themselves, irrespective of the rights 
of third persons, is whether it was the intention 
of the parties to be partners. As between the 
partners, partnership rests on mutual consent, 
which may be manifested by the terms of their 
agreement, the conduct of the parties to each 
other under it, or by the circumstances generally 
surrounding the transaction in question.'' 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, Sec. 48-1-3, defines a partner-
ship as: 
" ... an association of two or more persons 
to carry on as co owners a business for profit.'' 
(Uniform Partnership Act, Sec. 6.) 
There is no written agreement between the parties. 
In such cases the Utah Code Ann. 1953, Sec. 48-1-4 pro-
vides the following pertinent rules for determining the 
existence of a partnership: 
''In determining whether a partnership exists 
these rules shall apply: 
* * * 
(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of 
itself establish a partnership, ,, .. hether or not 
the persons sharing them have a joint or 
common right or interest in any property 
from 'vhich the returns are derived. 
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( 4) The receipt by a person of a share of the 
profits of a business is prima facie evidence 
that he is a partner in the business, but no 
such inference shall be drawn if such profits 
were received in payment: 
* * * 
b. As wages of an employee or rent to a 
landlord. '' 
Of all the. possible elements included in a partner-
ship agreement, an agreement to share profits is an 
essential element of the partnership relation. As stated 
in 68 C.J.S., Partnership, Sec. 17, p. 427: 
''An agreement to share profits, although not 
necessarily express, is an essential element of the 
partnership relationship and, at least as between 
the parties themselves, there must be a community 
of interest, or right to participate in the profits of 
the business or venture before it can be said that 
an agreement of partnership has been entered 
into and exists. The absence of a mutual interest 
in the profits is conclusive that a partnership does 
not exist . . . '' 
Although a sharing of profits raises a presumption 
of a partnership (Kimball v. McCornick, 70 Utah 189, 
259 P. 313 (1927), such is not the result if such share 
is received as wages of an employee. Utah Code Ann. 
1953, 48-1-4 ( 4) (b). To constitute an element of a part-
nership, profits which a partner is to share must be real 
profits, not wages. 
Kuenzi v. Radloff, 253 Wis. 575, 34 N.W. 2d 798 
(1948); 
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Roberts v. Wachter, 104 Cal. App. 2d 281, 231 P. 
2d 540 (1951). 
Jenkins v. Ha~rris, 19 Tenn. App. 113, 83 S.W. 2d 
562, 566 ( 1935) holds : 
''An agreement to contribute labor in con-
sideration of receiving a part of the profits of an 
enterprise does not create a partnership, where 
such profits are paid as compensation for the 
labor contributed. Wagner v. Buttles, 151 Wis. 
668, 139 N.W. 425, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 144, 147." 
Further, in Keller v. Wixon, 123 Utah 103, 255 P. 
2d 118 ( 1953) this court, in discussing admissibility of 
evidence relating to services rendered by a partner said, 
at page 119: 
"Section 48-1-15 (6), U.C.A. 1953, provides 
that 'No partner is entitled to remuneration for 
acting in the partnership business, except that a 
surviving partner is entitled to reasonable com-
pensation for his services in winding up the 
partnership affairs.' To the same effect is Forbes 
v. Butler, 73 Utah 522, 275 P. 772, 775, wherein 
we stated: 'The amount of compensation either 
party in a partnership or joint venture is entitled 
to receive, in the absence of contract otherwise, is 
dependent upon the profits made from such joint 
venture'.'' 
The parties clearly agreed that Plaintiff "'BS to be 
allowed to withdraw sums of money for his personal 
needs. However, the nature of such withdrawals and 
vvhat amounts \\7ere to be \vithdra"'1l is not clearly stated 
by either party. Both testified that they expected pro-
ceeds from the trailer court operation to be used for 
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expenses of clearing the land and making other improve-
ments, but that such receipts were not, or did not appear 
to be adequate to provide much help and that Defendant 
had to supply necessary funds from her personal funds. 
Regarding the withdrawals made by him, Plaintiff, when 
asked if he offered to pay back any of the money he had 
taken during the time he was in Moab, replied: ''No. 
That wasn't the bargain.' (Ex. 2: Dep. VM 25). He 
further stated : ''My time was worth her money. Time 
is money.'' and denied that he considered the money a 
loan or salary or anything except possibly expense 
money. (Ex. 2: Dep. VM 25, 26). Whatever the under-
standing of the parties may have been, it was indefinitely 
stated by both at the trial. 
Other evidence available in the record sheds more 
light on the nature of the arrangement between the 
parties, but indicates that there is no mutual under-
standing sufficient to support the finding of a partner-
ship. 
The Plaintiff's own evidence shows that a minimum 
of some $5,569.39 for which receipts were issued or which 
he otherwise is shown to have received for the trailer 
court, came into Plaintiff's hand up to July 1, 1955 (R. 
185). The records on expenditures placed in evidence 
by Plaintiff account for expenditures of $94 7.13 (R. 185) 
in the same period, exclusive of withdrawals by Plain-
tiff. An additional $624.60 was expended, which could 
not be identified as to whether paid by Plaintiff from 
business collections or from personal funds of De-
fendant (R. 185). 
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Even if the Plaintiff is placed in the most favorable 
position by crediting him with these expenditures, a 
balance of $3,997.66 is left, the disposition of which is 
unexplained by Plaintiff. A specific breakdown on re-
ceipts and disbursements in July, 1955, is not shown in 
the summaries in evidence and so is omitted here-. 
Further, whether Plaintiff was working elsewhere dur-
ing July, 1955, is not clear. 
The Plaintiff has failed to account for an average 
of $70.13 for each week of the 57 weeks from May 20, 
1954, to July 1, 1955. If Plaintiff is considered not to 
have also paid the additional $624.60, the average would 
have been $81.09 a week. 
The Plaintiff testified he estimated the value of 
work performed by him to have been $90.00 a week (R. 
27, Line 27). Plaintiff also testified that he works for 
$2.85 an hour; (Ex. 2: Dep. V~1: 30), but stated his 
present average monthly income to be $380.00 (R. 26, 
line 27). 
When four weeks are excluded to show the month 
or more during which Plaintiff had full-time outside 
employment, the weeldy average of funds received by 
the Plaintiff without explanation of their disposition 
would then be either $75.42 or $87.20. 
By the Plaintiff's O\Yll evidence, it is shown that 
from the trailer court operation and during his stay in 
Moab, Plaintiff received into his possession and is 
unable to account for a sum of money approximately 
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equal to his normal income for a like period. In addi-
tion he received his living quarters (Ex. 2: Dep. VM 9). 
This is the minimum and is shown by his evidence. 
It is submitted that the evidence is preponderately 
against existence of a partnership because; (1) Plain-
tiff received sums of money approximating his normal 
income; (2) Plaintiff denies any obligation to repay 
such sums (Ex. 2: Dep. VM 25, 26); and (3) no agree-
ment between the parties is shown which would make 
such arrangement a partnership understanding. 
It is further submitted that only a finding that no 
partnership existed is consistent with the evidence of 
Plaintiff's need (R. 107); close family ties (R. 106); 
assumption of all trailer court debts by Defendant (Ex. 
2: Dep. VM 18, lines 29, 30; 19, lines 1, 2) ; and termina-
tion of the business association of the parties in July, 
1955, without requiring Plaintiff to account fully for 
collections and income received by him. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IN JULY, 
1955, THE PAR.TIES HAD AN ACCOUNTING AS TO 
INCOME RECEIVED AND EXPE·NDITURES MADE AS 
OF THAT TIME WITHOUT THE BUSINESS ASSOCIA-
TION OF THE PARTIES BEIN'G DISSO,LVED AND 
TERMINATED. 
In addition to finding that a partnership agreement 
was entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant for 
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the construction and running of a trailer court (Finding 
1, R. 187), and that the land was not part of the partner-
ship assets but belonged to Defendant (Finding 2, R. 
187), the court also found that Plaintiff was to provide 
his own labor and supervise construction and that 
''profits were to pay for the improvements as far as 
possible" (Finding 3, R. 187). No finding was made 
regarding withdrawals made by Plaintiff or regarding 
termination of the partnership, except insofar as they 
may have been covered by finding 7 (R. 188), which is: 
"7. In July, 1955, Plaintiff and Defendant 
had an accounting as to income received and 
expenditures made as of that time, and third 
person was hired to run the business.'' 
It is difficult to determine the legal implication of 
the Court's Finding 7. "Income" might mean collection 
at the trailer court and not include payments by De-
fendant for capital and for operating expenses. ''Ex-
penditures'' could mean capital and operating expendi-
tures and still not include ''Tithdrawal of funds by the 
Plaintiff. 
The Defendant's position is that the parties termi-
nated their business relationship in the trailer court 
when Plaintiff left l\Ioab in July, 1955; that Plaintiff 
thereafter had no further interest in the trailer court; 
and that based on this understanding an exact deter-
mination of what each o'Yed the other 'Ya.s dispensed 
\vith and 1hl\ accounts called eYen. 
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The discussion under Point I, supra, is hereby in-
corporated by reference for the purpose of showing the 
unreasonableness of any other conclusion. 
The parties are not lawyers nor experienced 1n 
operations of the character of the trailer court. It is 
not likely that both parties understood that their busi-
ness relations might be construed by law to be a part-
nership, nor that if they had so understood would have 
known the significance of such partnership as applied to 
their obligations. The questions involved are sufficiently 
disputed to require decision in this appeal. It is also 
unreasonable to assume that this niece, no matter how 
generous and no matter how conscious of family ties 
would knowingly agree to her uncle's having a continuing 
one-half interest in the trailer court and at the same 
time relinquish her right to repayment for monies ad-
vanced by her and give up her right to any excess of 
funds the Plaintiff may have withdrawn. The Defendant 
remained obligated for the debts of the trailer court; the 
Plaintiff considered himself absolved of any responsi-
bility for such debts. Such actions, when coupled with 
a mutual agreement as to settlement, constitutes not 
only a dissolution but also a termination of such part-
nership. Plaintiff took his possessions, including two 
cars and a trailer, to Salt Lake City, and was assisted 
by the Defendant and her friend. Plaintiff obtained 
work immediately upon return to Salt Lake, and although 
his testimony is conflicting seems to have continued to 
work at all times therefter. 
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ln the absence of a partnership agreement, the 
business relation would clearly have been terminated. 
A finding that such a partnership existed as a matter 
of law required some determination as to whether such 
partnership continued after July, 1955, and if so, until 
when. The court makes no finding that the partnership 
has ever been dissolved, but by considering records of 
the operation of the trailer court only through December, 
1956, in arriving at a purported accounting between the 
parties, implies that dissolution occurred then. 
If at all, this was a partnership by consent. The 
rule regarding dissolution of such partnerships is stated 
in 68 C.J.S., Partnership, Sec. 334, p. 847: 
''No particular form of agreement is neces-
sary to dissolve a partnership by consent. Such 
dissolution may be accomplished either by an 
express agreement or by words and acts implying 
an intention to dissolve. A partnership entered 
into verbally may be dissolved in the same man-
ner. Dissolution may be sufficiently evidenced 
by acts of all the partners showing their intention 
that the partnership between them shall cease, or 
by acts or conduct participated in, or assented to, 
by all the partners, inconsistent with a continua-
tion of the partnership between them, although 
liquidation is not completed or some appearance 
of partnership continue.'' 
In Fisher v. Fisher, 83 Cal . .L\pp. 2d 357, 188 P. 2d 
802, (1948), at page 803, the court said: 
"And, as stated in Griffeth v. Fehsel, 61 Cal. 
App. 2d 600, 605, 143 P. 2d 522, 524: 'Parties to 
any sort of a business arrangement are their own 
best judges of the accounts bet"~een themselves. 
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They understand their own plans and purposes 
as "\veil as their settlements and after they have 
reached an understanding to dissolve and have 
agreed upon an accounting, courts must not undo 
such mutual, extra-judicial determinations. Bran-
ger v. Chevalier, 9 Cal. 353, 363; 20 Cal. Jur. 819, 
820 '." 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, Sec. 48-1-28, provides: 
"Dissolution is caused: 
(1) Without violation of the agreements between 
the partners : 
(a) By the termination of the definite term 
or particular undertaking specified in the 
agreement. 
(b) By the express will of any partner when 
no definite term or particular undertaking is 
specified. 
* * * * 
(2) In contravention of the agreement between 
the partners, where the circumstances do not 
permit a dissolution under any other provi-
sion of this section, by the express will of 
any partner at any time. * * * '' 
Even if a partnership existed, and even if the 
Plaintiff did not subjectively intend that it be terminated 
in July, 1955, his leaving and working elsewhere, the 
acts of the Defendant at that time, and, as the Plaintiff 
testified, her acts in preventing his return to Moab, dis-
solved the partnership. Such was the right of either 
party. An accounting or other settlement would follow 
such dissolution, leading to a final termination of the 
partnership. 
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If the accounting found by the Court (Finding 7, 
R. 188) was not coincident with a complete termination, 
the rights of the Plaintiff depend upon the time the dis-
solution did take place. A finding of wrongful exclusion 
is precluded because the partnership is one at will, and 
since there is neither evidence to support or a finding 
of any fraudulent conduct, the rule of Graham v. Street, 
109 Utah 460, 166 P. 2d 524 (1946), which allowed 
sharing of profits after dissolution, is inapplicable. 
It is submitted that the trial court erred in not find-
ing as part of Finding 7 (R. 188), that coincident with 
the accounting bet\veen the parties, the partnership, if 
any, was dissolved and terminated with neither party 
having any claim against the other thereafter. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING DISTRIBUTION 
OF P'URPORTED PARTNERSHIP ASSETS IN MANNER 
CONTRAR.Y TO UTAH CO·DE ANN. 1953, SEC. 48-1-37. 
Uta.h Code Ann. 1953, Sec. 48-1-37, provides in per-
tinent parts : 
''In settling accounts between the partners 
after dissolution the following rules shall be 
observed, subject to any- agreement to the con-
trary: 
* * * * 
(2) The liabilities of the partnership shall rank 
in order of payment, as follows : 
(a) Those owing· to creditors other than 
partners. 
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(b) Those owing to partners other than for 
capital and profits. 
(c) Those owing to partners ln respect of 
capital. 
(d) Those owing to partners ln respect of 
profits.'' 
a. The trial court had before it a purported claim 
by Ira Niillett which, if valid, would have to be paid 
before any distribution to the partners. (R. 72). 
b. The trial court has before it evidence of capital 
contribution by Defendant in the amount of $4,105.11 
for buildings and improvements and for equipment in 
the period ending July 1, 1955, as well as additional 
business disbursements by Defendant in the same period 
of $637.55, making a total of $4,742.66 (R. 185). The 
court makes no provision for repayment of such ex-
penditures by Plaintiff from her personal funds, nor for 
reimbursement to her of similar expenditures and ad-
vancement of capital subsequent to July 1, 1955. 
In Tiffan.y v. Short, 22 Cal. 2d 531, 139 P. 2d 939, 
940 ( 1943), the court said, concerning a joint venture 
to which it applied the rules of partnership law: 
''The trial court found that the agreement 
was a joint venture. The general rule applicable 
to dissolution in such cases is that in the absence 
of an express agreement to the contrary, the 
person advancing capital is entitled to its return 
before there is a division of income or profits. 
. . . In the present case there was no specific 
agreement as to division of assets upon dissolu-
tion. Therefore a division and distribution into 
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equal parts before the return of capital, all of 
which had been advanced by one party, would 
be improper.'' 
This is the rule of Utah Code Anrn. 1953, Sec. 48-1-37, 
but is not the rule applied by the trial court. 
In addition there is authority for the rule that a 
non-capital contributing partner is not entitled to share 
in the capital upon dissolution. H'IJ/Ybter v. Allen, 147 P. 
2d 213, 17 4 Ore. 261 ( 1944), modified on other grounds, 
148 P. 2d 936, 174 Ore. 26. 
c. The trial court had before it evidence of excess 
withdrawals by Plaintiff but makes no provision for 
repayment of withdrawals. 
Finding 7 purports to discharge Plaintiff of any 
obligation to make such repayment, but as discussed 
under Point II, supra, which discussion is hereby incor-
porated by reference, such finding must imply a dis-
solution of the partnership and termination as well, 
with all claims by each partner against one another and 
against the partnership assets settled in full. 
d. The trial court purported to distribute net profits 
after July, 1955, when in fact the net profit so deter-
mined ineluded pre-July, 1955 items (Finding 8, R. 188). 
On page 184 of the record, the certified public ac-
countant shows cash receipts for the period July 1, 1954, 
to the end of 1956 by the three figures of $5,569.39, 
$5,067 .18, and $4,362.04, ,making total receipts of 
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$14,998.61. ''Business Disbursements'' for the same 
periods are shown as $6,314.39, $3,146.82, and $3,974.68, 
making a total of $13,435.89. Subtracting the business 
disbursements from the cash receipts leaves a sum of 
$1,562.72, which is to the penny the amount found by 
the trial court to be the net profits since July, 1955. 
e. Further, the trial court failed to recognize the 
dissolution of such partnership as may have existed 
either in July, 1955, when Plaintiff left Moab, or at 
such time thereafter as Plaintiff testifies Defendant 
refused to allow him to return ( R. 44). The dissolution 
having occurred at one time or the other, termination of 
the partnership would have proceeded thereafter (Utah 
Code An!flA. 1953, Sec. 48-1-27) pursuant to the provisions 
of Utah Code Ann. 1953, Sec. 48-1-37. 
f. The trial court failed to give consideration during 
the period after such dissolution to the respective capital 
interests of the parties. 
This court stated several of the rules applicable to 
this type of controversy in Graha;m v. Street, 2 Utah 2d 
144, 270 P. 2d 456, 459 (1954). Therein the court com-
pared the rules applicable to a fraudulent dissolution 
and continued use of property with the rules applicable 
where the dissolution is not fraudulent. This court said: 
''There is another reason why neither com-
pensatory nor punitive damages should have been 
allowed. The Uniform Partnership Act, Utah 
Code Ann. 1953, 48-1-28, establishes in each 
partner an indefeasible right to dissolve the 
partnership even where the partners covenant 
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that the partnership will continue for a number 
of years, the only consequence being that in a 
partnership for a definite term the dissolving 
partner subjects himself to a claim for damages 
for breach of contract and for an accounting. 
Atha v. Atha, 303 Mich. 611, 6 N.W. 2d 897. This 
being so in a partnership for a definite term, a 
fortiori in a partnership for at will, where an 
accounting must be the exclusive remedy since 
no contract has been breached. Normally, this 
accounting encompasses that interval between 
formation of the partnership and the time when 
actual notice is brought home to the partner that 
the relationship is to be dissolved. Fisher v. 
Fisher, 83 Cal. App. 2d 357, 188 P. 2d 802. How-
ever, a different situation is presented where the 
expulsion is fraudulent and there is continued 
use of the partnership assets. * * *. '' 
Except in such cases as Graham v. Street, 109 Utah 
460, 166 P. 2d 524 (1946) dealing with fraud, the general 
rule is that a partner is entitled to subsequently earned 
profits in the proportion that his interest in capital or 
assets used to earn such profits bears to the total capital 
or assets used to earn such profits. 40 Am. J ur. Partner-
ship, Sec. 386, p. 397, n. 16. 80 A.L.R. 48. Where there 
is no interest in capital, such a partner does not share 
in subsequent profits. 80 A.L.R. 68. 
40 Am. Jur., Partnership, See. 390, p. 398 states 
the universally accepted rule applicable to the facts of 
this case: 
''The right of a partner to share in the 
profits earned by the continuation of a partner-
ship business after the dissolution. of the firm is 
founded upon the use to ''rhieh such partner's 
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interest in the capital of the firm has been put 
in earning these subsequent profits, and if the 
partner claiming an interest in the profits earned 
after the dissolution of the partnership has no 
interest in the capital of the firm after dissolu-
tion, he is not entitled to share in the profits 
earned. The same result is reached where the 
complaining partner's interest in the capital is 
negligible .... It would seem that if, by reason 
of ... the excessive indebtedness of the partner 
to the firm, the partner has no interest, or at least 
a nominal interest, remaining in the firm, he 
should not be entitled to a share of the subse-
quently earned profits.'' 
g. The trial court erred in granting an In Personam 
money judgment against the Defendant. 
Because of the necessity for winding up affairs in 
accord with the law applicable to partnerships, it has 
been held that ''. . . (a) personal judgment cannot be 
entered against a parnter in a suit for accounting and 
settlement until all the partnership assets have been 
converted into money, the debts paid and a final balance 
ascertained.'' Steinberg v. Goldstein, 129 Cal. App. 2d 
682, 278 P. 2d 22 (1955). 
In Driskill v. Thompson, 141 Cal. App. 2d 479, 296 
P. 2d 834 (1956) the court said that a personal judgment 
would not, as a general rule, lie until the assets had been 
converted into money, debts paid, and a :final balance 
struck between the partners. An exception would be 
where there were found to be no third party liabilities. 
Such a :finding cannot be inferred from the court's failure 
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to so find, for there was evidence to the effect that there 
were outstanding third party liabilities. 
Even if an unterminated partnership existed, there 
has been no accounting as the complaint requested. The 
court found that the defendant had contributed her own 
funds for the construction and operation of the business, 
but has failed to consider repayment of such contribu-
tions ahead of a distribution of assets as profits. Such 
is required by Utah Code Arun. 1953, Sec. 48-1-37, 
Hooper v. Barranti, 81 Cal. App. 2d 570, 184 P. 
2d 688 (1947); 
Olmo v. Olmo, 56 Cal. App. 2d 590, 133 P. 2d 866 
(1943). 
If upon a proper determination of the matter it 
should be determined that there are no third party debts 
owing, assuming an unterminated partnership, it would 
then be proper to ascertain the value of the partnership 
assets and to strike a balance between the parties 
without a sale, but not without a proper consideration 
of the withdrawals of the plaintiff which must be bal-
anced against any interest in assets or profits he may 
have otherwise coming ot him, and not without a repay-
ment of the advances and capital of the defendant. And 
in the event the assets are insufficient to repay the 
defendant her capital and a.dYances and her share of 
the profits, if any, it ,, .. in be incumbent upon the plain-
tiff to contribute his proportionate share of such loss, 
as well as account for his "Tithdra",.als. 
Utah Code An.(n. 1953, Sec. 48-1-37 (1) (b). 
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h. The trial court erred in applying the system pro-
vided in the Occupying Claimants Statute (Utah Code 
Ann. 1953, Sees. 57-6-1 thru 8) to distribution of pur-
ported partnership assets. 
Even assuming that the buildings and improvements 
are partnership assets, the court's judgment (R. 190) 
is not in accord with the rules for distribution of part-
nership assets which provide a detailed system and set 
of priorities in the distribution of partnership assets. 
Utah Code An;n.. 1953, Sec. 48-1-37. 
The plaintiff and his brother, Ira, testified as to 
possible outstanding liabilities (R. 39, 72). The court 
made no finding on the question of third party liabilities. 
Since it is part of the plaintiff's case to prove he merits 
a distribution, such a finding is a necessary element to 
support his judgment. Its omission infers a finding 
against Plaintiff. 
Mosley v. Magnolia, 45 N.M. 230, 114 P. 2d 740 
1941); 
Coffinberry v. J.llcClellan, 164 Ind. 131, 73 N.E. 
97 (1905). 
Further the plaintiff testifies that the defendant 
provided money from her own personal funds for the 
construction and operation of the trailer court (R. 39, 
41, 59, 63). The court's sixth finding expressly recog-
nizes that the defendant used some of her own money 
in the operation. (Finding 6, R. 188) 
Still further, the court found that the ''land was to 
be provided by the Defendant and not to be partnership 
assets" (Finding 2, R. 187). Evidence shows Defendant 
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made some payments for operation of the trailer court, 
by giving land. No credit has been given Defendant for 
such payments. Also, there is no indication of any 
payments or credits to Defendant for rent. By the pur-
ported use of the Occupying Claimants Statute, the court 
would be forcing Defendant to sell her land even though 
she may have no desire to do so. Such a ruling would 
be unreasonable against a third party landlord. It is 
no less unreasonable in this case. 
POINT IV. 
THE JUDGMENT MUST FAIL BECAUSE THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS O·F LAW DO 
NOT SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT 
For the reasons outlined in this Point, and in the 
preceding points, the defendant submits that the judg-
ment is not supported by the findings of fact and the 
conclusions of law. Since a judgment is based upon the 
findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it follows 
that the judgment must fall. 
U. S. v. Seminole Na.tion,. 299 U.S. 417, 57 S. Ct. 
283, 81 L. Ed. 216 ( 1937). 
Sinee the plaintiff has not seen fit to cross-appeal 
or file a statement of points in the manner provided in 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, he cannot attack the 
court's failure to find. 
U.R.C.P. 74(b): 
U.R.C.P. 75(d): 
Fo1uers ·v. Lau·son, 56 Utah 420, 191 P. 227 (1920); 
LcT.,..1:nc l'. Tl'hitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 109 P. 2d 
1910); 
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3 W i.tkin, California Procedure 2229, Sec. 72; 
H emigson v. Bank of .America, 32 Cal. 2d 240, 244, 
195 P. 2d 777 (1948). 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant submits that the evidence and the 
findings of fact do not support a judgment for the Plain-
tiff. Exercise of this court's responsibility to review the 
record and evidence before the trial court will substan-
tiate the Defendant's position that there was no partner-
ship between the parties, and that even if there were a 
partnership such partnership was dissolved and termi-
nated with an account stated when the Plaintiff left Moab 
in July, 1955. 
The remaining points in the Defendant's brief indi-
cate wherein the judgment of the trial court is erroneous 
in case Defendant's above position is not sustained by 
this court. 
Defendant prays that this court reverse the judg-
ment of the lower court and order judgment entered for 
the Defendant, or if such reversal not be granted, that 
a new trial be ordered with instructions consonant with 
statutory law in order that the rights of the parties may 
be protected by a full and accurate accounting. 
Respectfully submitted, 
H. BYRON MOCK and 
ROBERT L. SCHMID 
Attorneys for Appellan.t. 
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